Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 3 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 4

January 2007

Violence in the Courts: The Ninth Circuit's
Attempt to Grapple With and Pin Down What Is a
"Crime of Violence" in United States v. Serna
Daniel S. Cho

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Daniel S. Cho, Violence in the Courts: The Ninth Circuit's Attempt to Grapple With and Pin Down What Is a "Crime of Violence" in United
States v. Serna, 37 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (2007).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol37/iss3/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Cho: What Is a Crime of Violence

NOTE
VIOLENCE IN THE COURTS:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ATTEMPT TO
GRAPPLE WITH AND PIN DOWN
WHAT IS A "CRIME OF VIOLENCE" IN

UNITED STATES v. SERNA
INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are arrested while in possession of a ftrearm, and you
plead guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.c. § 922(g)(l).1 Several years
earlier, you pled guilty to being in possession of a sawed-off shotgun in
violation of a state statute criminalizing the possession of such weapons. 2
The government now seeks to enhance your sentence for the § 922(g)( 1)
violation by asking the district court to classify your previous state-court
conviction as one for a "crime of violence.,,3 Under current law, if the
I 18 V.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2007) (providing: "[ilt shaH be unlawful for any person
who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.").
2 A sawed-off shotgun is a shotgun, or a weapon made from a shotgun, that has been
modified to have a shortened barrel of less than eighteen inches in length. See 26 V.S.C.A. §
5485(a) (West 2007); see also Cal. Pen. Code § 12020(c)(1) (2006); Cal. Pen. Code § 12001.5
(2006).
3 See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.l(a)(4)(A) (2006) (applying a Base Level Offense of 20 if "the
defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction
of either a crime of violence or a controHed substance offense"); see V.S.S.G. § 4BI.2 (2006)
(defining "crime of violence" as "any offense under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that ... has as an element the use, attempted use, or
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indictment, charging papers, or the written plea agreement are available
in the record, the district court may find that the state-court conviction
constitutes a crime of violence and double your sentence. 4 However, if
the record does not contain the aforementioned documents, the district
court will find the state-court conviction is not a crime of violence and
your sentence will remain at the base level for the current offense. 5 As
the above hypothetical demonstrates, a court's determination of whether
an offense is a violent crime can significantly impact the length of
sentencing for convicted defendants, 6 and possibly result in "two- and
threefold increases in their presumptive sentences, often as a result of
convictions that are quite old, and for which they originally received
little or no jail time." 7
Xavier Serna pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a fIrearm. 8
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that Serna's prior
conviction of possession of an assault weapon was a conviction of a
crime of violence for sentence enhancement purposes. 9 The court held
that Serna's state-court conviction for possession of an assault weapon, 10
in violation of California Penal Code § 12280(b), was not for a crime of
violence, and the conviction could not be used as a sentence
enhancement. II This decision hinged on the lack of documentation
available to the Ninth Circuit regarding the underlying facts of Serna's
previous state-court conviction. 12 Without more information, the Ninth
Circuit could only consider the statutory definition of the crime in
determining whether possession of an assault weapon constituted a crime
of violence for sentencing purposes. 13 The Ninth Circuit held that the

threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or ... otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.").
4 See United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying the sentencing
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 (a)(4)(A».
5 See Serna, 435 F.3d at 1047-49 (stating that where the record does not contain the
charging papers, mere possession of a firearm is not a crime of violence).
6 For purposes of this Note, the terms "crime of violence" and "violent crime" will be used
interchangeably.
7 Lynn Hartfield, Feature: Challenging Crime of Violence Sentence Enhancements in
Federal Court, 30 CHAMPION 28, 28 (2006).
8 Serna, 435 F.3d at 1046.
9 [d. at 1047.
10 See California Penal Code § 12276.1 (defining "assault weapon" to include some
semiautomatic rifles, semiautomatic pistols with magazines holding more than ten rounds, and
shotguns with revolving cylinders); see also United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2006).
II See United States v. Serna. 435 F.3d 1046,1049 (9th Cir. 2006).
12 See id. at 1047.
13 See id.
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felon-in-possession offense,14 as defined in California Penal Code §
12280, does not require proof that the possession occurred in a "context
prone to violence.,,15 As there was no further information in the record
regarding Serna's crime, the Ninth Circuit concluded that mere
possession of an assault weapon did not pose a substantial risk of
physical injury to another. 16
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit embarked on an extensive
analysis of the federal weapons registration requirement. 17 At no point,
however, did the Ninth Circuit acknowledge what type of weapon Serna
had pled guilty to possessing. IS Confusingly, the Ninth Circuit held that
Serna's possession of the unidentified weapon was not a crime of
violence. 19 This conclusion was based on an analysis of legitimate and
illegitimate uses of certain weapons, without knowing what weapon to
scrutinize. 20
This Note examines the limitations of the strict categorical
approach; the method by which sentencing courts and courts of review
determine whether an offense is a crime of violence for sentence
enhancement purposes. 21 Part I of this Note examines the "crime of
violence" sentence enhancement under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines,,).22 Part II examines the Ninth Circuit's
analysis of what constitutes a crime of violence in United States v.
Serna?3 Part ill proposes that the types of sources available to
sentencing courts when analyzing whether an offense is a violent crime
should be expanded based on Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in
Shepard v. United States. 24 Allowing sentencing courts to consider
uncontradicted evidence will provide them with the means to effectuate
14 For purposes of this Note, the term "felon-in-possession" will be used to mean the
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
15 See Serna, 435 F.3d at 1049 (citing United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469,472 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that a prison is a context prone to violence because "[tlhe confines of a prison
preclude any recreational uses for a deadly weapon and render its possession a serious threat to the
safety of others.").
16 See id.
17 See United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047-49 (9th Cir. 2006).
18 See id. at 1047 (stating that Serna was convicted for possession of "an object").
19 [d. at 1049.
20 See id. at 1047-48.
21 This Note will not discuss the "crime of violence" analysis pertaining to pre-trial detention
under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, a, amended by Pub. L. 99-646,
100 Stat. 3607, and codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3141-3150 and 3156 (involving a similar analysis of
whether the offense is a "crime of violence").
22 See infra notes 27-87 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 88-132 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 133-171 and accompanying text.
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Congress's purpose in enacting federal gun laws, by punishing repeat
offenders while maintaining the protections afforded to criminal
defendants under the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. 25 Finally, Part IV concludes that the
proposed expansion of sources will remove arbitrary determinations of
"crimes of violence" based on missing or incomplete court records,
leading to more consistent and uniform sentences. 26
1.

BACKGROUND

A.

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

1.

Purpose of the United States Sentencing Commission and the
Sentencing Guidelines

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the United States
Sentencing Commission ("Commission") and authorized the
Commission to establish and implement sentencing policies for the
federal criminal justice system. 27 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
"were created in order to reduce judicial discretion, to create more
uniform sentences for similarly situated offenders, and to promote
honesty in sentencing. ,,28 Thus, the purpose of the Guidelines was to
"provide direction as to the appropriate type of punishment-probation,
fine, or term of imprisonment-and the extent of the punishment
imposed.,,29

2.

Unlaaful Possession of a Firearm By a Felon Is Not a Violent
Crime Under the Guidelines

In Stinson v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held
that the commentary to the Guidelines interprets and explains the
provisions of the Guidelines, and therefore is authoritative, unless the

See infra notes 143-166 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text.
27 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 991 (West 2007) (establishing the Sentencing Commission "as an
independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States" for the purpose of 28 U.S.C.
§991(b)(I}, and "establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice
system."}.
28 Kendall C. Burman, Comment: Firearm Enhancements under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1055, 1057-58 (2004); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 253 (2005) (holding that "Congress' basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the
sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity.").
29 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36,41 (l993) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(I}(A} and (B)).
25

26
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commentary violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the Guidelines themselves. 3D At issue in
Stinson was Amendment 433, which added a sentence to the commentary
to section 4B 1.2 of the Guidelines Manual. 31 Amendment 433 states that
"[t]he term 'crime of violence' does not include the offense of unlawful
possession of a fIrearm by a felon.,,32 Thus, the Stinson Court held that
Amendment 433 was a binding interpretation of the Guidelines'
defInition of "crime of violence,,,33 and federal courts may not use a
felon-in-possession offense as a sentence enhancement because it is not a
crime of violence. 34
The Stinson Court held that "commentary which functions to
interpret a [G]uideline or explain how it is to be applied, controls,,,35 and
failure to consider the commentary "would constitute an incorrect
application of the [G]uidelines.,,36 In reaching its holding, the Court
reasoned that "the functional purpose of commentary . . . is to assist in
the interpretation and application of those rules, which are within the
Commission's particular area of concern and expertise and which the
Commission itself has the fIrst responsibility to formulate and
announce.,,37 As the Commission's interpretation of its own rules, the
commentary must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous, violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent
with the regulation. 38 The Stinson Court thus presumed that "the
interpretations of the [G]uidelines contained in the commentary represent
the most accurate indications of how the Commission deems that the
[G]uidelines should be applied to be consistent with the Guidelines
Manual as a whole as well as the authorizing statute. ,,39
The Stinson holding has been criticized for increasing the power of
the Commission beyond Congress's original intent. 40 Significantly,
amendments to the actual Guidelines must fIrst be reviewed by Congress
See id. at 38.
See id. at 39.
32 U.S.S.G. § 4BI.2 cmt. n.1.
33 See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 47-48.
34 See id. at 47.
35 See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1993) (quoting Williams v. United
States, 503 U.S. 193,203 (1992».
36 See id.
37 1d. at 45.
38 1d. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945».
39 See id. at 45.
40 See Todd L. Newton, Commentary that Binds: The Increased Power of the United States
Sentencing Commission in Light of Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 19/3 (1993),17 U. ARK
LrITLERocKLJ. 155,156(1994).
30

31
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for a period of six months before they take effect and have the force of
law.41 However, the commentary to the Guidelines is not subject to
Congressional review. 42 The Stinson holding, therefore, allows the
Commission to change the Guidelines by amending the commentary,
thus avoiding the Congressional review process. 43 Despite this criticism,
the Stinson holding remains valid, and when applicable, the "Guidelines
have the force of law."44
3.

Application o/the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Is Advisory and
Not Mandatory

When the Guidelines were first implemented, federal courts were
required to apply the rules promulgated by the Guidelines regarding
sentencing of persons convicted of federal crimes. 45 In 2005, however,
the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker that the
mandatory application of the Guidelines violates the Sixth Amendment
and is therefore unconstitutional. 46 Yet the Booker Court held that the
Guidelines, while no longer mandatory, must still be consulted and
considered by the district courts when sentencing based on convictions
for federal crimes. 47 Although the Guidelines are merely advisory, if a
district court chooses to apply the Guidelines when sentencing, the court
must consider the commentary to the Guidelines as well. 48 In so holding,
the Booker Court sought to determine Congress's likely intent in
promulgating the Guidelines in light of the Court's holding that
mandatory application of the Guidelines was unconstitutional. 49
If the application of the Guidelines is no longer mandated, then the
commentary to the Guidelines is also no longer binding on federal
sentencing courts. 50 The district courts are only required to consider the
Guidelines and commentary to the Guidelines when imposing sentencing

See 28 U.S.C.A § 994(p) (West 2007); see also Newton, supra note 40, at 165.
See Newton, supra note 40, at 164.
43 [d.
41

42

44 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 324 (2004) (citing Stinson v. United States, 508
U.S. 36 (1993) (emphasis added».
45 See 18 U.S.C.A § 3553(b)(l) (West 2007).
46 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires juries, not judges, to find facts relevant to sentencing determinations).
47 See id. at 264 (stating that the Sentencing Commission and Guidelines remain in place and
should be taken into account by district courts when making sentencing determinations).
48 See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.s. 36, 38 (1993).
49 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 265.
50 See id. at 264.
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based on convictions for federal crimes. 51 Thus, the district courts are no
longer bound by the commentary to the Guidelines, which state that the
felon-in-possession offense is not a crime of violence. 52 Since Booker,
courts may analyze the felon-in-possession offense using the wellestablished categorical approach in determining whether the felon-inpossession offense constitutes a crime of violence. 53
B.

THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO VIOLENT -CRIME ANALYSIS

In United States v. Sherbondy, the Ninth Circuit announced a strict
categorical approach to determining whether a prior offense constitutes a
"violent felony" for sentence enhancement purposes. 54 The strict
categorical approach provides that a trial court may only look to the fact
of conviction and to the statutory definition of the crime in order to
determine whether the offense is a "violent felony" as defined by 18
U.S.c. § 924(e)(2)(B).55 The Sherbondy strict categorical approach does
not permit the trial court to inquire into the facts underlying the
defendant's conviction, such as the specific conduct of the defendant in
committing the offense. 56 The Sherbondy court restricted the trial court's
inquiry by limiting the court's analysis to the categories of offenses. 57
This limitation decreases the possibility of inconsistent adjudication by
avoiding reliance on subjective factors when determining the
appropriateness of sentence enhancements. 58
Three years after the Ninth Circuit's holding in Sherbondy, the
United States Supreme Court endorsed the categorical approach in
51

See id.

See infra notes 54-87 and accompanying text.
The majority of jurisdictions apply a categorical approach, rather than a case-by-case
approach, to determine whether an offense constitutes a "crime of violence." See United States v.
Singleton, 182 F.3d 7,10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Carter, 996 F. Supp. 260, 261-62
(W.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Gloster, 969 F. Supp. 92,94 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v.
Washington, 907 F. Supp. 476, 484 (D.D.C. 1995); United States v. Aiken, 775 F. Supp. 855, 856
(D. Md. 199\); United States v. Marzullo, 780 F. Supp. 658, 662 n.8 (W.D. Mo. 1991); United
States v. Phillips, 732 F. Supp. 255, 261 (D. Mass. 1990); United States v. Johnson, 704 F. Supp.
1398,1400 (E.D. Mich. 1988».
54 See United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1009 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying the
categorical approach to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(8) which defines a "violent felony" as any crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than a year that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against another or is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use
of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another).
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 1009 n.17 .
52

53
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Taylor v. United States. 59 In Taylor, the Court held that for purposes of
sentence enhancement, a court should only look to the fact of conviction
because the statutory definition of the prior conviction determines
whether the offense is a crime of violence. 60 Under Taylor's categorical
approach, the sentencing court should look only to the language of the
statute under which the defendant was convicted, and may not inquire
into the underlying facts of the conviction. 61 The Court did, however,
carve out an exception for the "narrow range of cases where a jury was
actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary.,,62 In those
circumstances, the Taylor Court held that a sentencing court may look to
the charging papers and the jury instructions used to convict the
defendant in deciding whether the offense is a crime of violence. 63
The Ninth Circuit has expanded the Taylor exception to allow a
sentencing court to look to judicially noticeable facts and the judgment
of conviction, as well as any signed guilty plea and transcript from plea
proceedings, to determine whether an offense is a violent crime. 64 In line
with this expanded approach, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v.
Sahakian that a sentencing court may look to the elements of the offense
charged or to the actual charged conduct to determine whether the
conduct itself posed a serious risk of physical injury to another and was
therefore a violent crime. 65 Applying the expanded categorical approach,
the Sahakian court held that a felon-in-possession offense was not a
crime of violence, relying on Amendment 433 and other circuits' similar
decisions. 66
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court settled any lingering
issues of what documents a sentencing court may consider when
determining whether a prior conviction was a violent crime, in Shepard
v. United States. 67 In Shepard, the government sought to introduce
police reports to determine whether the defendant's prior conviction was
for "generic burglary," thereby subjecting the defendant to a mandatory

See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
id.
61 See id. at 600.
62 See id. at 602.
63 See id.
59

60 See

64 See United States v. Etimani, 328 F.3d 493, 503-504 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing numerous
Ninth Circuit opinions which have expanded the types of documents which may be reviewed under
the categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States).
65 See United States v. Sahakian, 965 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1992).
66 See id. at 742 (citing several other circuits' decisions holding that the felon-in-possession
offense did not constitute a crime of violence).
67 Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13,26 (2005).
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sentence enhancement. 68 The Shepard Court stated that the underlying
purpose of the Court's decision in Taylor was to avoid situations where
subsequent courts would hold evidentiary hearings to determine the
factual basis for earlier convictions. 69 Accordingly, the Shepard Court
held that sentencing courts were limited to the statutory definition,
charging document, written plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquy,
and any explicit factual findings assented to by the defendant. 70
Before Shepard, in United States v. Young, the Ninth Circuit
announced a two-step approach to determining whether an offense
constitutes a crime of violence under section 4B1.2 of the Guidelines. 71
The first step requires looking to the statutory elements of the offense
charged to determine whether one of the elements of the offense is the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. 72 If the offense
does not contain such an element, the second step is to determine
whether the actual charged conduct presented a serious risk of physical
injury to another. 73 This second step restricts the analysis of the offense
to the conduct charged and convicted. 74 The court may look to charging
papers, indictments, jury instructions, or other facts of which the court
may take judicial notice. 75 In reaching its holding, the Young court
reasoned that looking to the actual charged conduct "is consistent with
the directive contained in the Guidelines, which instructs courts to
consider 'the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the count of
which the defendant was convicted,' to determine whether that conduct
'by its nature[] presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another. ",76 However, where the record does not contain the charging
papers, jury instructions, or verdict forms, the sentencing court must
adhere to the strict categorical approach outlined in Sherbondy, looking
only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the offense. 77
Thus, defendants charged with the same offense could receive different
68 Id. at 15-16 (stating that the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.c. § 924(e), mandates a
minimum fifteen-year prison sentence for possession of a firearm after three prior convictions for
violent felonies, and "makes burglary a violent felony only if committed in a building or enclosed
space ('generic burglary').").
69 Id. at 20.
70 1d. at 26.

See United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1993).
See id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See id.
76 United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.2 emt.
71

72

n.2).
77

See United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1993).
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sentences depending on whether the trial record contains the charging
papers or indictment. 78
In United States v. Parker, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
lost or destroyed documents. 79 According to Parker, a sentencing court
may not rely upon the charging papers alone when determining whether
a prior jury conviction constitutes a violent felony.8o Further, the Parker
court reasoned that the Supreme Court's holding in Taylor requires the
sentencing court to look only to documents that verify facts actually
found by the jury.81 Absent such documents, the sentencing court must
adhere to the Sherbondy categorical approach. 82
Parker recognized that adherence to the Sherbondy categorical
approach, in situations where court documents were lost or destroyed,
may benefit criminal defendants,83 because some convictions that would
have been considered "violent felonies," had the records been preserved,
would not count as such after the destruction of the records. 84 However,
the court chose to adopt an equitable sentencing principle that lessens the
impact of a conviction over time, by reasoning that the problem of lost or
destroyed documents will affect primarily older convictions rather than
recent ones. 85 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the passage of time
should dilute the effect of past conduct on punishment for present acts. 86
Consequently, if a felon is charged with unlawful possession of a
fIrearm, the decision to enhance the sentence may depend only on
whether court records were properly kept and maintained, so as to allow
the sentencing court to determine what type of weapon the defendant was
carrying. 87
II.

ANALYSIS

A.

THE VIOLENT CRIME ANALYSIS IN UNITED STATES V. SERNA

In Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski's opinion in United States v. Serna,
the Ninth Circuit held that the possession of an assault weapon is not a

See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
Parker, 5 F.3d at 1322.
80 [d. at 1327.

78

79

81

[d.

82

[d. at 1328.

United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1993).
/d. at 1327-28.
85 [d. at 1328.

83

84

86

/d.

87

See infra notes 114-132 and accompanying text.
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crime of violence for purposes of section 4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines. 88
Section 4B 1.2(a) of the Guidelines defines a "crime of violence" as "any
offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that ... has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or . . .
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.,,89 Because mere possession of a weapon does not involve the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another,
Serna's prior conviction could only constitute a violent crime if the court
determined that simple possession of an assault weapon "presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.,,90 The court held that
it did not. 91 Serna's prior conviction for possession of an assault
weapon, therefore, was not considered a crime of violence and could not
be used to increase his sentence under the Guidelines. 92
1.

Inherently Dangerous Weapons Have Few Legitimate Uses

In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit relied on the distinction
between weapons with legitimate uses and those that have no lawful
purpose. 93 The court found that "[s]o long as the item in question has
substantial legitimate uses, its mere possession cannot, without more,
constitute a crime of violence.,,94 Conversely, "if the universe of uses for
such an object is largely confined to illegitimate violence, [the court] can
infer that the object will be used to intimidate or inflict physical injury ..
. [and therefore, the] illegal possession of such [an object] ... is a crime
of violence.,,95 The Ninth Circuit used this "legitimate purposes" test to
distinguish "ordinary firearms" from silencers and sawed-off shotguns. 96
The court cited sporting and self-defense as examples of legitimate
purposes. 97 "Unlike an ordinary firearm, [silencers and sawed-off
shotguns are not] likely to serve any sporting or self-defense purpose.
Thus, we have held that they 'are inherently dangerous, lack usefulness
United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006).
See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).
90 Serna, 435 F.3d at 1047 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a».
91 ld. at 1049.
88

89

ld.
[d. at 1048.
94 United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006).
95 [d. at 1047-48 (citing United States v. Delaney, 427 F.3d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Hayes, 7 F.3d 144, 145 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Huffuines, 967 F.2d 314,
320-21 (9th Cir. 1992».
% Serna, 435 F.3d at 1048.
97 [d.
92

93
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except for violent and criminal purposes and their possession involves
the substantial risk of improper physical force. ",98 Therefore, the key
determination is whether an assault weapon is more like an ordinary
fIrearm, or more like a silencer or sawed-off shotgun. 99 Because
silencers and sawed-off shotguns are required by Congress to be
registered, and assault weapons are not, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
assault weapons are more like ordinary fIrearms. loo The Ninth Circuit
concluded that possession of assault weapons does not pose a substantial
risk of physical injury, and therefore, Serna's prior conviction for
possession of a fIrearm is not a crime of violence. 101
2.

Inherently Dangerous Weapons Must Be Registered

The Ninth Circuit also found that Serna's prior state-court
conviction was not a crime of violence on the ground that Congress did
not require semiautomatic weapons to be registered. 102 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that since Congress did not require semiautomatic weapons to
be registered, they are not inherently dangerous and do not pose a risk of
physical injury. 103 According to the Ninth Circuit, "[t]he registration
requirement reflect [s] Congress's determination that certain weapons are
almost certain to be used for unlawful purposes."I04 Thus, according to
the Ninth Circuit, if Congress requires a weapon to be registered, the
weapon is considered to have few, if any, legitimate uses. lOS Conversely,
if Congress does not require a weapon to be registered, the weapon has
legitimate uses and is less likely to be used unlawfully. 106
The Serna court also cited United States v. Brazeau, in which the
Seventh Circuit held that "most firearms do not have to be registeredonly those that Congress found to be inherently dangerous.,,107 Thus, if
Congress did not require the weapon to be registered, the weapon had
some lawful use and was less likely "to lead to unlawful violence than
98 [d. at 1048 (citing United States v. Delaney, 427 F.3d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Hayes, 7 F.3d 144, 145 (9th Cir. 1993».
99 United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006).
100 [d. at 1049.
101 [d.

102 See id. at 1048 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5845 as the comprehensive list of weapons that are
required to be registered).
103 See id. at 1048 (citing United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Brazeau, 237 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001».
104 United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006).

106

[d.
[d.

107

/d. at 1048 (quoting United States v. Brazeau, 237 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001».

105
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[the weapons required to be registered].,,108 The Ninth Circuit held that
because Congress has never placed a "blanket registration requirement"
on semiautomatic weapons, mere possession of a semiautomatic weapon
does not pose a significant risk of physical injury, and therefore, mere
possession is not a crime of violence. 109
With the introduction of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress made the possession of some
semiautomatic weapons a federal crime. 110 The Act placed a ten-year ban
on possession of assault weapons. III However, Congress allowed the ban
to lapse without requiring the registration of previously banned
weapons. 1I2 The Ninth Circuit found that because the current federal
policy considers assault weapons to be on "the same footing as other
non-registrable weapons," mere possession of these assault weapons,
without more, cannot constitute a crime of violence. 113
B.

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STRICT CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO
VIOLENT -CRIME ANALYSIS

The Serna opinion illustrates an important issue regarding the
current structure for analyzing whether an offense is a violent crime.
Due to the restrictions placed on the Ninth Circuit by the strict
categorical approach, the Serna court applied the registration
requirement and legitimate uses test to generic semiautomatic weapons
without any information regarding the specific type of weapon possessed
by Serna. 1I4 However, a sentencing court cannot truly be assured that
mere possession of a weapon is not a crime of violence without actually
knowing what type of weapon the defendant possessed. 115
The Serna court found that even objects that are designed to be
lethal may have legitimate uses. 116 In the court's opinion, "[s]o long as
the object in question has substantial legitimate uses, its mere possession

lOS

[d.

United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006).
[d. at 1048 (citing Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322 (lapsed 2004».
III See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322
(lapsed 2004).
112 Serna, 435 F.3d at 1049.
113 [d.
109

110

114 See United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046,1047 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that Serna's prior
conviction was for possession of an "object").
115 See infra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
116 Serna, 435 F.3d at 1047.
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cannot, without more, constitute a crime of violence.',ll7 In addition, the
court found that semiautomatic weapons were never subject to a blanket
registration requirement,118 which suggests that mere possession of such
weapons does not pose the same risk of physical injury as those weapons
that are subject to blanket registration requirements. 119 Although the
context in which the possession occurs may constitute a crime of
violence in and of itself,120 nothing in the California Penal Code section
12280 requires proof that the possession occurred in a context prone to
violence. 121 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that without more
information about Serna's particular offense, mere possession of an
. not a cnme
. 0 fVl0
' Ience. 122
assau It weapon is
According to the Guidelines,123 the felon-in-possession offense is
not a crime of violence unless the flrearm falls under the definition of
"flrearm" in 26 U.S.c. § 5845(a).124 This means that in a case of mere
possession of a firearm by a felon, the specific type of weapon possessed
can be determinative of whether the possession offense is a violent
crime. 125 However, under the strict categorical approach outlined in
Sherbondy and Taylor, the sentencing court is not permitted to inquire as
to the specific facts underlying the conviction. 126 Therefore, if the
statutory deflnition of the possession offense does not contain an element
117

Id.

Id . at 1048.
See id. at 1049.
120 United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing the possession of
melted-down shaving razors in prison to be a "crime of violence" because of the inherent danger of
possessing such items in the context of a prison environment).
118
119

121

Id.

Id .
123 See U.S.S.G. § 4BI.2 n.1 (stating that a "[c]rime of violence does not include the offense
of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, unless the possession was of a firearm described in
26 U.S.C. § 5845(a».
124 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) defines a ''fuearm'' to include sawed-off shotguns, machineguns,
weapons with silencers, and destructive devices.
125 While most jurisdictions have held that mere possession of a fuearm is not a crime of
violence, various jurisdictions have held that possession of a firearm combined with certain conduct
does constitute a "crime of violence." See Mary E. McDowell, The Importance of Structural
Analysis in Guideline Application, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 112 (2002) (citing United States v. Williams,
892 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. McNeal, 900 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Walker, 930 F.2d 789 (lOth Cir. 1991); United States v. Goodman, 914 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Cornelius, 931 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1991).
126 See United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1009 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying the
categorical approach to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), which defines a "violent felony" as any crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than a year that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against another or is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use
of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990).
122
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of physical force, and if the record is silent as to the type of weapon
possessed, the Parker holding restricts the sentencing court's analysis to
· categonca
. I approac h. 127
t he stnct
Under the Sherbondy strict categorical approach to the possession
offense with which Serna was charged,128 the offense could not be
considered a crime of violence under section 4B 1.2(a)(l) of the
Guidelines because the statute did not have as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another. 129 In addition, because the record did not contain any
information regarding the type of assault weapon unlawfully possessed
by Serna, or the context in which the possession occurred, the court was
limited to the strict categorical approach. 130 Lastly, because the record
did not contain the charging papers or any explicit factual findings by the
trial judge, under Shepard the Ninth Circuit could not consider any
information other than the statutory definition of the offense. 131
Therefore, regardless of how dangerous the weapon was that Serna was
found in possession of, his sentence could not be enhanced under
Sherbondy's strict categorical approach. 132
Ill.

ExpANDING THE AVAILABLE SOURCES TO GUIDE THE VIOLENT
CRIME ANALYSIS

The determination of whether a prior felon-in-possession conviction
constitutes a crime of violence may hinge on what information is
available in the record for the consideration of the sentencing court. 133
This determination can have a significant impact on the length of a
criminal sentence. l34 In the interests of justice and accurate sentencing,
such an important determination should not turn on whether the state
properly kept and maintained court records.
See United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1993).
Cal. Pen. Code § I 2280(b) (2006).
129 See Cal. Penal Code § 12280(a) (2006) (prohibiting the manufacture, distribution, sale, or
possession of any assault weapon).
130 See United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying United States v.
Young, 990 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1993».
131 See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
132 See United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1993) (restricting the sentencing
court's analysis to the statutory definition of the crime and to the conduct "expressly charged" in the
indictment); see also Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16 (limiting the sentencing court's examination to "the
statutory definition [of the offense], charging document[s], written plea agreement[s], transcript[s] of
plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.").
133 See supra notes 114-132 and accompanying text.
134 See Serna, 435 F.3d at 1047 (applying the sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1 (a)(4)(A».
127

128
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENTING OPINION IN SHEPARD V. UNITED
STATES

The current case law in the Ninth Circuit restricts sentencing courts
to a categorical analysis of the statutory offense and limits the inquiry to
the charging papers, jury instructions, and judicially noticeable facts. 135
Because these restrictions can result in arbitrary sentencing based on
missing court records and analysis of generic weapons,136 sentencing
courts and courts of review should be allowed to employ a more flexible
approach based on Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Shepard v.
United States. 137
In Shepard, the majority restricted the sentencing court's analysis to
the statutory definition of the offense and judicially noticeable facts. 138
The Court rejected the government's contention that a sentencing court
should be permitted to look to police reports and complaint
applications. 139
Criticizing the majority opinion as one that
"substantially frustrate[s] Congress' scheme for punishing repeat violent
offenders who violate federal gun laws,',I40 Justice O'Connor's·
dissenting opinion suggested that a sentencing court's analysis should be
expanded to include "any uncontradicted, internally consistent parts of
the record from the earlier conviction.,,141 Under this expanded list of
sources, a sentencing court would be allowed to consider police reports
and complaint applications for uncontradicted facts regarding the prior
conviction. 142
B.

THREE REASONS TO EXPAND THE AVAILABLE SOURCES TO
INCLUDE POLICE REpORTS AND UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE

1.

Effectuating the Purpose of Federal Gun Laws

Restricting the sentencing court's analysis to the statutory definition
and charging documents frustrates Congress's underlying purpose in
enacting federal gun laws: to punish repeat violent offenders. 143 The
See United States v. Parker,S F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1993).
See supra notes 79-132 and accompanying text.
137 See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005) (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
138 1d. at 16.
139 See id. at 23.
135

136

at 28 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 31 (2005) (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
142
1d.
140 Id.

141

143

See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 35 (2005) (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J.,
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current restrictions placed on sentencing courts force these courts to
ignore relevant and uncontradicted evidence regarding prior convictions
and allow defendants to benefit from the unavailability of court
records. l44 As Justice O'Connor stated, the sentencing court should not
be forced to "feign agnosticism about clearly knowable facts.,,145 A
defendant's sentence should not depend on whether a State's "record
retention policies happen to preserve the musty 'written plea agreements'
and recordings of 'plea colloquies' ancillary to long-past convictions."I46

2.

Expanding the Sources to Include Uncontradicted Evidence Does
Not Violate the Constitution

Allowing sentencing courts to consider clear and uncontradicted
evidence written in police reports does not run afoul of any due process
rights or the right to a jury trial as provided by the Constitution. 147
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the trial judge conducted an evidentiary
hearing following a guilty plea. 148 The judge concluded that the evidence
supported a finding that the crime was motivated by racial bias, thereby
enhancing Apprendi' s sentence above the statutory maximum. 149 The
United States Supreme Court reversed the sentence, holding that under
the Sixth Amendment, any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction,
that increases the sentence beyond the statutory maximum, must be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 150
Four years later, in Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court
affIrmed the Apprendi ruling and held a Washington State sentencing
procedure unconstitutional because it allowed judges to determine facts

dissenting).
144 See id. at 29 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145 [d. at 35 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146 [d. at 36-37 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147 U.S. CONST. amend. XiV. (providing that "[no State shalll deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (providing that "[iln all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."); see Shepard, 544 U.S.
at 37-38 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,470 (2000).
149 [d. at 471 (increasing Apprendi's sentence from a maximum of twenty years to a
maximum of thirty years).
ISO U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (providing that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed."); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (finding a New Jersey hate crime
statute unconstitutional because it authorized a judge to increase the maximum sentence by finding
aggravating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence).
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that gave rise to sentences above the statutory maximum. 151 In Blakely,
the trial judge sentenced the defendant to three years above the
maximum standard range based on a finding that he had acted with
deliberate cruelty in kidnapping his estranged wife. 152
In Cunningham v. California, decided in 2007, the Court struck
down California's determinate sentencing law because it authorized a
judge, rather than a jury, to find facts allowing the imposition of an
upper-term sentence. 153 In Cunningham, the trial judge found six
aggravating circumstances, including the vulnerability of the victim and
that Cunningham's violent conduct posed a serious danger to the
community.l54 As a result, Cunningham was sentenced to the upper-term
limit of sixteen years. 155
Although the Supreme Court has continued to apply the Apprendi
rule requiring juries, not judges, to determine facts that give rise to
sentences above the statutory maximum,156 the Court has also held that
"when a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial
sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the
relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding.,,157 In the same vein,
unchallenged factual determinations in prior convictions, made with
procedural safeguards attached, mitigate any due process or Sixth
Amendment concerns "otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to
determine a 'fact' increasing punishment beyond the [statutory]
maximum." 158 As such, where facts are admitted in a guilty plea, and
those facts are uncontradicted during sentencing, the sentencing court
should be free to examine those facts during sentencing without running
afoul of the Constitution.
Allowing sentencing courts to examine police reports for
uncontradicted facts is also outside the applicable scope of the Apprendi,
Blakely, and Cunningham holdings, as those cases dealt with a judicial
determination of the subjective intent of the defendant, rather than
objective facts. 159 The facts found in Cunningham were "neither inherent

151 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (holding that Washington's
sentencing procedure did not comply with the Sixth Amendment).
152 [d. at 303.

153

Cunningham v. California, No. 05-6551, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1324, at *43 (Jan. 22, 2007).

154

[d. at *13.

155/d.
156

at *11.

[d. at *24.

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 u.s. 466, 488 (2000) (distinguishing Apprendi from
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)).
159 See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text.
157

158
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in the jury's verdict nor embraced by the defendant's plea."I60 When a
defendant pleads guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm, the defendant
must necessarily be admitting to possessing the firearm that he was
charged with possessing. As in Apprendi, Blakely, and Cunningham, the
defendant may challenge any determinations made by the judge as to the
defendant's subjective intent in possessing the fIrearm, 161 but by pleading
guilty to the possession offense, the defendant must admit to possessing
the particular fIrearm.
In order to determine what weapon the defendant pled guilty to
possessing, a judge would not have to conduct any additional or
independent factfinding, or any subjective analysis of previously found
facts. A sentencing court could simply look to the police report to
determine the type of weapon that the defendant was charged with and
later pled guilty to possessing. If the defendant wanted to challenge the
weapon determination, the defendant could do so under the sentence
appeal procedures already in place. 162
When considering police reports to determine what type of weapon
the defendant pled guilty to possessing, the main concern of the
sentencing court should be the fairness to the defendant. However,
"there is nothing unfair (and a great deal that is positively just) about
recognizing and acting upon plain and uncontradicted evidence that a
defendant, in entering his prior plea, knew [what] he was being
prosecuted for and was pleading guilty to.,,163 So long as the prior
conviction and guilty plea were established through procedures satisfying
the fair-notice, reasonable-doubt, and jury-trial guarantees, the
sentencing court should not be prevented from considering evidence that
the defendant did not contest, and that formed the basis of the guilty plea.
3.

Allowing Uncontradicted Evidence Will Not Impose Any Additional
Burden on Sentencing Courts

Taylor itself did not establish rules for cases involving guilty pleas
and the list of available sources for the sentencing courts provided by the
Taylor exception was not intended to be exhaustive. l64 Allowing
sentencing courts to consider police reports and uncontradicted evidence
is consistent with Taylor's central purpose, which was to effectuate
160 Cunningham

v. California. No. 05-6551, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1324, at *11 (Jan. 22, 2007).
See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text.
162 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(j) (providing for a defendant's right to appeal and requiring the
court to advise the defendant of that right to appeal after sentencing).
163 Shepard v. United States. 544 U.S. 13,36 (2005) (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164 See id.
161
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Congress's categorical approach to sentencing. 165 Furthermore, allowing
sentencing courts to consider police reports and uncontradicted evidence
does not run afoul of Taylor's other purpose of avoiding "the
impracticality of mini-sentencing-trials featuring opposing witnesses
perusing lengthy transcripts of prior proceedings."I66 Consideration of
uncontradicted and undisputed evidence, which form the basis for the
defendant's guilty plea, would not lead to any need for opposing
witnesses or submission of counter-evidence.
C.

APPLYING THE EXPANDED SOURCES TO SERNA'S CASE

An examination of the police report and complaint application for
uncontradicted facts may have led to a different outcome in Serna, but
surely an examination of such documents would lead to less arbitrary and
more consistent results when analyzing felon-in-possession convictions
as crimes of violence. Under the current framework of analysis, the
sentencing court must first look to the statutory definition of the offense
to determine whether the offense contains an element of the use of
force. 167 If the offense does not contain such an element, the court must
determine whether the actual charged conduct presented a serious risk of
physical injury to another. 168 If the defendant was found guilty by a
judge or jury, the sentencing court may look to the charging papers, jury
instructions, and explicit factual findings to determine whether the actual
charged conduct presented a serious risk of physical injury to another. 169
Under an analysis incorporating the use of uncontradicted evidence,
when the defendant pled guilty to the felon-in-possession offense, the
sentencing court may look to the sources stated above, as well as the
police report and complaint applications, to determine what type of
weapon the defendant pled guilty to possessing.
If sentencing courts were allowed to look to the uncontradicted
factual evidence contained in the police report, courts of review would
not be forced to engage in an unnecessary analysis of registration
requirements and illegitimate uses of unspecified objects. 170 Sentencing
165 See id. at 36 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, 1., dissenting) (stating that "[tlhe issue most central
to Taylor was the need to effectuate Congress' 'categorical approach' to sentencing recidivist federal
offenders-an approach which responds to the reality of a defendant's prior crimes, rather than the
happenstance of how those crimes 'were labeled by state law."').
166 [d. at 36 (5-3 decision) (O'Connor, 1., dissenting) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575,601 (1990».
167 See United States v. Young, 990 F.2d469, 471 (9th Cir. 1993).
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 See

United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046,1047-48 (9th Cir. 2006).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol37/iss3/4

20

Cho: What Is a Crime of Violence

2007]

WHAT IS A "CRIME OF VIOLENCE"

561

courts and courts of review could instead look to the statutory definition
of the possession offense to determine whether the language of the
statute contains an element of force, and then look to the uncontradicted
evidence to determine what type of weapon was illegally possessed, if
such information was not found in the trial record. If the sentencing
court knew what type of weapon Serna possessed, it could have more
adequately determined whether possession of such a weapon posed a
serious risk of physical injury to another. Such certainty would create a
more uniform application of the Guidelines in deciding the length of a
sentence in felon-in-possession situations. 171
IV. CONCLUSION

The proposed expansion of sources to aid the analysis of the felonin-possession offense as a violent crime should be narrowly applied to
cases where the defendant pled guilty to the possession offense and the
type of weapon possessed is missing from the trial court's record. 172
Properly applied, this analysis will relieve sentencing courts from having
to conduct time-consuming examinations of weapons registration
requirements and illegitimate uses for unspecified weapons. 173
Furthermore, the proposed expansion of sources will remove the
arbitrary determination of "crimes of violence" based on missing or
incomplete court records, leading to more consistent and uniform
sentences. 174

DANIEL S. CHO'

See id. at 1047.
See supra notes 156·163 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 123-171 and accompanying text.
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